As far as India and Pakistan are concerned, talking, calling off talks, resuming talks, is a recurring cycle. The two countries will be inextricably engaged with one another forever. Exchange of mortars and rockets across the LoC (Line of Control) can be seen as a not so silent form of dialogue! In the bargain, soldiers on the two sides and innocent Kashmiris living on both sides of the border have been the unfortunate victims.
Yet another cancellation
Cutting short the long and familiar story of the flip flops on talks, let us take a close and critical look at the 2015 NSA (National Security Advisor) level talks that were not held. India and Pakistan were once again under international pressure to resume talks after the Foreign Secretary level talks scheduled in 2014 were cancelled. Prime Ministers (PMs) Narendra Modi and Nawaz Shariff were in Russia to attend the Summit Meeting of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). Russia and China seemed to have urged them to do something positive before the Summit ended. The meeting of the two leaders and the Joint Statement issued afterwards seemed to be hurried and spontaneous, which also meant it was not well prepared.
One of the key outcomes of the Joint Statement was the scheduling of a meeting between the two NSAs in New Delhi soon. Other decisions announced included meetings between the Chiefs of the Border Security Force of India and the Pakistani Rangers, releasing of the fishermen in each other’s custody, facilitating religious tourism, and engagement to discuss ways and means of expediting the 26/11 Mumbai trial. The key operating part of the Joint Statement was that the two NSAs are to discuss “all issues related to terrorism”. For the first time, a Joint Statement issued by India and Pakistan did not mention the Kashmir issue. This was seen as a crucial breakthrough by the Indian side.
The repercussions of the missing K word
Instead of maintaining a discreet, low profile, the Indian side, especially the electronic media went to town celebrating India’s unprecedented “victory”. The Indian TV channels went overboard pressing the Pakistani spokesman on the panels on the glaring omission, to the latter’s utter discomfort. The damage was done. A few days after returning home Nawaz Sheriff had a meeting with the Army Chief, the ISI (Inter Services Intelligence) along with his NSA in attendance. It can be safely inferred that the stormy meeting was a prelude to the undoing of the terror talks to be held in New Delhi.
In his press conference of 13 July 2015, Sartaz Aziz, the seasoned diplomat and the NSA of Pakistan, initiated the diplomatic and publicised process of undoing the slip up in the joint communiqué issued in Ufa, Russia. He insisted that the Kashmir issue was very much subsumed in the formulation of “all issues related to terrorism”. He asserted that there was no dilution of the Kashmir issue, which is central to the relations between the two countries. The unfortunate process of unhinging the forward movement achieved at the meeting of the two PMs began in earnest. The inevitable happened and the NSA level talks scheduled for 23-24 August 2015 were called off by Pakistan. In the eminently avoidable “blame game” of who ran away from the talks first, India succeeded in pushing Pakistan over the brink.
However, in retrospect, the success did not amount to much of a victory for India. Many delicate questions of diplomacy and policy being undone by a badly managed process, came to the fore. If Kashmir issue is so vital for Pakistan, why wasn’t the word given some space in the Joint Statement? If “all outstanding issues related to terrorism” is understood to have included Kashmir, Pakistan’s Foreign Secretary Aziz Choudhary should have prevailed upon India’s Foreign Secretary S. Jaishankar to include Kashmir in the Joint Statement. Obviously, the only terrorism Ajit Doval, India’s NSA, would have discussed with Aziz at the meeting is terrorism in Kashmir and the ceasefire violations along the LoC. The Jammu & Kashmir (J&K) issue naturally would have cropped up and Aziz could have seized the opportunity to raise it. He would have then had the chance of raising the issue of Indian involvement in Baluchistan and Sindh as well. Pakistan goofed up by calling off the talks.
India’s faux pas?
On the Indian side, there was a critical slip up in the midst of the shrill and hectic race for one-upmanship that preceded the D-day. Pakistan’s insistence on meeting the Hurriyat leaders “before” and “after” the meeting of the two NSAs was a red herring. India made it clear that the Hurriyat leaders will not be allowed to meet Aziz or the High Commissioner of Pakistan. However, Aziz left the door ajar for the talks when he said, “We are disturbed about the arrest of the Hurriyat leaders, but if India doesn’t call off the talks we will go ahead with them”.
India should have taken advantage of the opening; let Aziz come for the talks, and then confronted him with all the evidence at its disposal on Pakistan’s collusion on terrorism in J&K and the plethora of ceasefire violations since July 2015. The opportunity to produce the terrorist (Naved of Faislabad) captured alive, before Aziz and the world was also lost. Now we have a second Pakistani terrorist in our custody. Our case would have been strengthened by the precedent. However, a word of caution is in order at this stage. Even if the talks were held and India succeeded in “exposing” the Pakistani perfidy on terrorism yet another time, there would have been no real change in the hostile neighbour’s policy of “bleeding India by a thousand cuts”. On the eve of cancelling the talks, Aziz brazenly accused India of “concocting stories” of Pakistani involvement in terrorism in J&K and ceasefire violations across LoC and the international border. If anything the country’s “denial mode” would have become more brazen and entrenched.
In any case, there will be yet another opportunity to “expose” Pakistan because sooner or later the bilateral dialogue at the political level would be resumed. The meeting of the Director-Generals of Military Operations of the two sides was held as scheduled. The focus of the meeting, if held, will be on the LoC violations and cross border terrorism with a view to de-escalate violence and loss of life and property. Let us see what would be the outcome of the meeting in the immediate future.
But, in all this hullaballoo, the larger and the enduring issues remain as elusive as ever. It is not clear as to what India is going to say to the other side when we meet. Should we ask them when they plan to cease their aggression in J&K? Should we ask them when will they stop exporting terrorism into J&K and other parts of India? In all the Modi bashing we see on the part of some sections in India, his “muscular” shift in dealing with Pakistan is missed. The “red line” on the Hurriyat leaders is aimed at eroding their legitimacy and relevance in our equation with Pakistan. It is a logical forward step in India’s established policy of no “third party” involvement in the Kashmir dispute. Whether the departure from the past will work or not, only the future will tell. Personally, I am in favour of the shift because the earlier posture and policies did not work. The deliberate effort to marginalise Hurriyat is to India’s advantage. The Indian government should stick to the goal of ignoring and isolating the Hurriyat at home and abroad.
Conclusion
In recent months, most Pakistani spokesmen have discovered a new argument in defense of their country on terrorism. They point out that Pakistan is the biggest victim of terrorism and it would be foolish for the country to indulge in exporting terrorism. This is a spurious argument and does not answer the question of terrorism emanating from the Pakistani soil across the LoC. After encouraging Islamic fundamentalism for decades, the sins are coming home to roost. Hafiz Saeed and other terrorists are now in a position to blackmail the government on its India policy as proved by the cancellation of the latest NSA level terror talks.
It is good to remember that even the mild-mannered Sartaz Aziz felt constrained to remind the viewers in India that Pakistan has nuclear weapons and the country knows how to take care of its interests. In another panel discussion, a former army chief of Pakistan referred to his country’s nuclear weapons in a more unrestrained language. Farooq Abdullah, who was on the same panel, shot back saying: “Don’t threaten us with nuclear weapons. If there is another war, Pakistan will be finished”. Such bravado on both sides will only make things worse than before.
The moral of the story is that India has to contend with the entrenched hostility of Pakistan’s military intelligence establishment with which the civilian leadership is compelled to go along. In international relations, like life in general, it is unrealistic to assume that all problems have solutions. Coping with them and learning to live with them is the enduring challenge India faces in dealing with Pakistan. What cannot be cured must be endured!
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B. Ramesh Babu
The writer is a specialist in international relations and American politics. He is the Scholar in Residence, Foundation for Democratic Reforms, Hyderabad. He was formerly the Sir Pherozeshah Mehta Professor of Politics, University of Bombay. Dr. Babu is also associated with Hyderabad based institutions of higher learning like the ICFAI, OUCIP, IPE, and the Central University.
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